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ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING-FOURTH AMENDMENT NATIONAL SECU-
RITY CASES-THE PRESIDENT NEED NOT OBTAIN A WARRANT TO WIRE-
TAP IN NATIONAL SECURITY CAsEs-Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp.
936 (D.D.C. 1973).
In June, 1972, in the case of United States v. United States District
Court,' the United States Supreme Court held that, under the fourth
amendment,2 the President, via the Attorney General, has no power to
authorize the electronic surveillance without prior judicial approval in
"domestic" security matters, i.e., matters related to the danger of over-
throw of the government by organizations having no significant connec-
tion with a foreign power.3 However, the Supreme Court did not an-
swer the question of whether or not the fourth amendment required the
President to obtain a warrant before wiretapping in "national" security
1. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). USDC arose from a criminal proceeding in which the
United States charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy government property
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). Defendant Plamondon was charged with the
dynamite bombing of the Central Intelligence Agency's office in Ann Arbor, Michigan,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), covering destruction of government property.
During pretrial proceedings, defendants filed a motion for disclosure of certain elec-
tronic surveillance information and for a hearing to determine whether this information
"tainted" the evidence which the government intended to offer at trial. In response,
the government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledging that its
agents had overheard conversations in which Plamondon had participated and that the
Attorney General had approved the wiretaps "'to gather intelligence information
deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to at-
tack and subvert the existing structure of the government.'" 407 U.S. at 300 n.2, quot-
ing Affidavit of Attorney General. The government contended that the surveillances
were lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise
of the President's power to protect the national security, which power the Government
asserted to be "'the historical power of the sovereign to preserve itself'" or "'the in-
herent power of the President to safeguard the security of the nation."' 444 F.2d 651,
658 (6th Cir. 1971), quoting the government's memoranda (emphasis omitted).
The District Court held that the surveillance was in violation of the protections af-
forded under the fourth amendment, granted the defendant's motion, and ordered the
government to disclose the information sought, whereupon the government filed a peti-
tion in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to set aside
the District Court order. That court found the District Court's decision proper and
affirmed. Id. at 669. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 403 U.S. 930 (1971),
and unanimously upheld the decision of the lower courts.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
3. 407 U.S. at 309 n.8.
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cases.4 A year later the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in Zweibon v. Mitchell' held that the President need not
obtain a warrant to conduct electronic surveillance in national security
cases.' The Zweibon court, while purporting to close the question left
open in USDC, improperly applied the domestic/national security dis-
tinction rendered in USDC, misinterpreted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and produced a misguided interpretation
of the fourth amendment.
Zweibon arose when the government admitted in open court in the
consolidated cases of United States v. Beiber7 and United States v.
Joffe, that conversations of certain defendants, all members of the
Jewish Defense League (JDL), had been overheard during electronic
surveillance conducted without a warrant.9 Defendants brought an ac-
tion under section 2520 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196810 for damages resulting from alleged unlawful electronic
surveillance during October, 1970 and from January 5, 1971 through
June 30, 1971.11
The Federal Bureau of Investigation initially requested authority from
the Attorney General to conduct the surveillance in September, 1970
on the ground that threatened JDL demonstrations would make secur-
ity for foreign dignitaries attending the United Nations session more
difficult and could cause "international embarrassment to this coun-
try" if not curbed with the assistance of electronic surveillance.1  .
In January, 1971, a second application and authorization followed
4. Id. at 308.
5. 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973).
6. Id. at 943-44. See also United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 n.*
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (infers that USDC allowed warrantless electronic surveillance author-
ized by the Attorney General in cases of foreign espionage).
7. 71 CR 479 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 1971).
8. 71 CR 480 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 1971).
9. 363 F. Supp. at 938.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) provides:
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used
in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any per-
son who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept,
disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any
such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate
of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute
a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or
under any other law.
11. 363 F. Supp. at 938.
12. Id.
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demonstrations against Soviet diplomats and official Soviet govern-
ment protests. 13 Subsequent authorizations were granted on the basis
of the successful wiretaps which resulted in FBI infiltration and preven-
tion of the JDL's embarrassing activities, as well as on the basis of con-
tinuing Soviet protests, threats that private citizens in Moscow would
retaliate in kind against Americans, and news of actual retaliation. 4
The Attorney General determined that the JDL activities were "detri-
mental to the continued peaceful relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union and threatened the President's ability and consti-
tutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of this country."1
The district court concluded that, on the basis of USDC, the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act did not apply to "na-
tional" security surveillances and that "it is the executive and not the
judiciary, which should determine whether or not an electronic sur-
veillance requires prior judicial authorization." 16
Both Zweibon and USDC are cases which involve the applica-
tion of section 2511 (3) of Title IlI of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. It provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary
to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect na-
tional security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor
shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the consti-
tutional power of -the President to take such measures as he deems nec-
essary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Govern-
ment by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The
contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of
the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received
in evidence in any trial hearing or other proceeding only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or dis-
closed except as is necessary to implement that power.' 8
The USDC Court advanced two significant interpretations of sec-
tion 2511(3), both relevant to Zweibon. Initially, the Court stated
13. Id. at 938-39.
14. Id. at 939.
15. Id. at 942.
16. Id. at 942-43.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, 2511(3) (1970).
18. Id. § 2511(3).
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that "nothing in section 2511(3) was intended to expand or to con-
tract or to define whatever presidential surveillance powers existed."' 9
The section was merely an expression of neutrality, not a basis for ex-
ecutive authority to wiretap. 20  Since section 2511(3) was merely
19. 407 U.S. at 308 (emphasis omitted).
20. Id. In USDC, the Court recognized that the President has the fundamental duty
under Article II, section 1 "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States." 407 U.S. at 310. Implicit in that duty, according to the Court, is the
power to protect the Government against subversion or overthrow by unlawful means,
and to carry out this duty if necessary by electronic surveillance. Id. The Court
failed, however, to provide any authority for finding that Article II, section 1, clause 7
conferred any substantive powers on the President. Rather, it might seem appropriate
to interpret the oath of office clause as a requirement that the President promise to do
his job lawfully. In fact, the Supreme Court in USDC for the first time in Consti-
tutional history had used the presidential oath of office clause to confer substantive
power. In the past, courts have often ignored the question of the executive's power
to conduct electronic surveillance. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.165,
170 n.3 (1968), rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 939 (1969). Other courts have merely
chosen to assume that the executive had the power without regard to its origin. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Justice Powell justified presidential use of electronic surveillance because it had been
sanctioned by previous administrations since 1946. 407 U.S. at 310. However, past
usage of a power, especially only intermittently (see id. at 310 n.10), is no justification
at all; the fact that unconstitutional powers have been used in the past does not thereby
establish justification. See Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 541-42 (N.D. Cal.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972). Justice Powell also
stated that unless the "[g]overnment safeguards its own capacity to function and preserve
the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and
liberties would be endangered." 407 U.S. at 312. To eschew the use of electronic
surveillance, maintained Justice Powell, would be contrary to the public interest in view
of conspirators' increased usage of telephones in the planning of their crimes. Id. at
311. Zweibon's holding that the President has power to wiretap was based upon his
duty to protect the national security (as in USDC) and upon his power to "conduct
...foreign relations." 363 F. Supp. at 942. But "the fact that power exists in the
Government does not vest it in the President." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579, 604 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Congress might better
have made this determination (id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring)), and, in
fact, appeared to have done so in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968. See note 10 supra.
USDC found the substantive power of the President to wiretap in the Oath of Of-
fice Clause; that is, based on his duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
tion. This power, coupled with the Curtiss-Wright holding that the President is the sole
organ of the federal government in foreign affairs, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), lays a
basis for the argument that he need not obtain a warrant when national as opposed
to domestic security may be involved. In other words, when national security wiretaps
are being considered, the President, without the judiciary or Congress, has the sole au-
thority to determine whether the warrantless surveillance is reasonable under the
fourth amendment. Zweibon alluded to this reasoning when it concluded:
Under the facts of this case, which show a clear threat to this country's foreign
relations, it is the executive and not the judiciary, which should determine whether
or not an electronic surveillance requires prior judicial authorization.
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a disclaimer, its constitutionality was not in question in either USDC21
or Zweibon.22 The issue was not whether the statute constitutionally
conferred authority upon the President to authorize warrantless wire-
taps. Since the statute conferred no power, the issue was whether the
office of the President had independently acquired this power without
running afoul of 4he fourth amendment.
Secondly, the USDC Court distinguished between cases of "na-
tional" security and those of "domestic" security. The term "na-
tional" security was applied to the activities of foreign powers because
it was used by Congress only in the first sentence of section 2511(3)
having reference to danger from foreign powers.23 The Court stated
that USDC involved criminal charges of conspiracy to destroy, and de-
struction of, government property, thereby falling within the second
sentence of section 2511(3) which concerns danger from "domestic"
organizations..2 4  It limited its holding requiring prior judicial approval
for wiretaps authorized by the President to "domestic" security mat-
ters25 and defined a domestic organization as a "group or organization
(whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens of
the United States and which has no significant connection with a foreign
power, its agents or agencies.1 26
Extrapolating from the USDC Court's statutory interpretation, a
two step approach should be applied when deciding a case involving
presidentially authorized wiretapping. Initially, it should be deter-
mined if the activity under surveillance is embraced by the language
of section 2511(3). If it is not the kind of activity covered by the
language of section 2511(3), clearly the Act itself would require a
warrant. Secondly, even if the activity were embraced within the
The electronic surveillances were installed in this case under the constitutional
authority of the President over the conduct of foreign relations and his inherent
power to protect our national security.
363 F. Supp. at 943. However, the Court would do well to remember that, "like every
other governmental power, [it] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution." 299 U.S. at 320. According to its own reasoning, the
fourth amendment contemplates a judicial determination. 407 U.S. at 316-17. In ad-
dition, there will be no protection against executive abuse where the President alone
or the Attorney General alone (as was the case in Zweibon, 363 F. Supp. at 942)
makes the decision to wiretap. 407 U.S. at 317.
21. 407 U.S. at 308.
22. 363 F. Supp. at 942.
23. 407 U.S. at 309 n.8.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 324.
26. Id. at 309 n.8.
27. If the surveillance under consideration does not fall within section 2511(3), then
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scope of section 2511(3), the court must determine whether the Presi-
dent is constitutionally empowered to authorize warrantless surveillance
the Act applies and there would be no reason to consider the constitutional issues. This
was the contention of Justice White in his concurring opinion in USDC, and it is
significant because a lesser showing of probable cause may be required under the fourth
amendment than under the Act. 407 U.S. at 338.
Justice White argued that the limitation of the applicability of section 2511 (1) is con-
fined to those situations which section 2511(3) specifically describes. 407 U.S. at 338.
Therefore, if the facts of a given case do not fall within the provisions of section 2511
(3), the interception is illegal without prior judicial approval, regardless of whether or
not the President otherwise would have the constitutional power to authorize it. Id. at
338 n.2. In USDC, Justice White found that the activities of the defendants, i.e., conspir-
ing to destroy government property, did not fall within the first sentence of section
2511(3) because it lacked any connection with a foreign power (id. at 340-41), nor
under the second sentence because the government failed to show that it was necessary
to prevent the overthrow of the government by unlawful means or that there was "any
other clear and present danger to the structure of the Government." Id. at 341. In
other words, Justice White construed the exceptions to the Act very strictly while the
majority used a broader construction denoting "domestic" and "national" security
cases which include subversion as exceptions.
Justice White concluded that because there was no determination of the existence of
a clear and present danger, the interception was contrary to the provisions of the stat-
ute and, therefore, subject to exclusion from evidence at any trial under section 2515
as the fruits of the warrantless electronic surveillance. Id. at 344.
The same argument can be applied to Zweibon. The sole assertion in USDC was
that the monitoring at issue was employed to gather intelligence information "deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and
subvert the existing structure of the Government." Id. at 335. The assertion in
Zweibon was that surveillance was employed to protect foreign relations. 363 F. Supp.
at 939-40. There was no judgment by the Government in either case that the surveil-
lance was necessary to prevent overthrow by force or other unlawful means or that
there was any clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
407 U.S. at 340-41; 363 F. Supp. at 939.
This raises the question as to what constitutes a "clear and present danger." Argu-
ably, the majority in USDC may have concluded that the destruction of government
property does present a clear and present danger to the structure of the government
because of the disruptive effect it may have. Likewise, in Zweibon it is arguable that
disruption of foreign affairs by a domestic organization also threatens the structure of
our government insofar as national confidence is concerned. Yet, in neither case were
these arguments advanced.
In fact, both of these activities may be classified as "subversive," and legislative in-
tent indicates that subversive activities are to be governed by the Act (114 Cong. Rec.
14,702-03 (1968) (remarks of Senator McClellan)), and, therefore, subversive activities
alone should not consitute a clear and present danger.
Senator Fong suggested that Title I be amended to apply only to organized crime
and to require a showing of a connection with organized crime before a warrant
is issued. Id. at 14,702. But Senator McClellan indicated that Title III was meant
to apply to subversive activities as well:
The main thrust of title III is directed at organized crime, subversive activities,
and other serious crimes. Each of the crimes contained in title III for which an
electronic surveillance or order [sic] may be obtained has been selected because
it is either serious in itself or characteristic of organized crime or subversives.
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of the activity, for section 2511(3) excludes only constitutional exer-
cises of presidential power from the scope of Title Mn. 28  The sentence
of the section into which the case falls-the first or the second--deter-
mines whether the case involves "national" or "domestic" security mat-
.Id.
In addition, he stated that the act was to allow the President to use his discretion
to act under the court order system with respect to the security of the government. Id.
at 14,703. The amendment suggested by Senator Fong was rejected. id. at 14,705.
Title III itself contains further confirmation in section 2516 of legislative intent to
include subversive activities within its scope. Section 2516 lists among the crimes cov-
ered, espionage, sabotage, and treason-crimes which involve either "national" or "do-
mestic" security. The statutes relating to espionage (18 U.S.C. §§ 792-99 (1948)),
cover any person who
for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent
or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation . . . , obtains information . . .
[from any] place connected with the national defense.
Id. § 793(a). It also applies to anyone who copies (id. § 793(b)), receives (id. §
793(c)) or delivers (id. § 793(d) & (e)) such information. Foreign agents and citizens
of the United States have been prosecuted under this statute. See, e.g., United States
v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Espionage also includes communication
of national defense material to a foreign government (18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970)) which
is defined as
any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a
foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons
purporting to act as a government within a foreign country.
Id. § 798(b). The statutes relating to sabotage (id. §§ 2151-57 (1970)) cover any
person who, "when the United States is at war or in times of national emergency" (id.
§§ 215(a), 2154(a)), intentionally interferes with or obstructs the war effort or the
national defense (Id. §§ 2155-56). Treason (id. §§ 2381-91) covers any person who,,
"owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their ene-
mies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere." Id. § 2381.
The broad coverage of these statutes, which were specifically included in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in spite of section 2511(3), lends heavy
support to demonstrate congressional intent to require a special determination by the
President, subject to judicial review, that a clear and present danger exists before the
President exercises any powers he may have outside the Act. Justice White, however,
believed Congress gave responsibility for determining whether or not there is a clear
and present danger to the President, not the judiciary. 407 U.S. at 343. If such a
requirement is not necessary, it is difficult to perceive a situation where electronic sur-
veillance concerning these crimes would be subject to the warrant requirement under
the Act; they invariably involve either "national" or "domestic" security. It is unlikely
Congress would render section 2516 of the Act meaningless.
The activities charged in USDC and Zweibon do not directly fall within any of
these definitions. If anything, they seem less of a danger to the structure of the gov-
ernment than the statutory subversive activities and thus would not appear to present
a clear and present danger within the meaning of section 2511(3).
What constitutes a clear and present danger remains a mystery. But, one must rec-
ognize the merit of Justice White's argument that, since the government failed to artic-
ulate any basis for clear and present danger to the existence or structure of the govern-
ment (id. at 341), the wiretap was illegal under the statute and there was no reason
to reach the Constitutional question. Id. at 344.
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ters, respectively. If it is a "domestic" security issue, USDC governs
and prior judicial approval is required before a presidentially author-
ized wiretap may be implemented. If, however, it involves a matter
of "national" security under section 2511(3), the court, in a case of
first impression, must balance the governmental interest, i.e., the neces-
sity of having the President unilaterally approve wiretaps in "national"
security matters, against the invasion of the individual's privacy pro-
tected by the fourth amendment, as did the court in USDC regarding
"domestic" security matters. The Zweibon court failed at both steps.
The Zweibon court considered the electronic surveillances con-
ducted against the J-DL to be in the nature of "national" security sur-
veillances and, therefore, within the disclaimer provisions of section
2511(3).2" Yet, nothing in that section suggests that the exclusion
from the Act's protection is proper to prevent embarrassment in foreign
relations. In the FBI memorandum requesting the initial surveillance,
the government put forth no proof that the nation was endangered by
"an actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign
power" or that it needed "to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect na-
tional security information."30  The Director of the FBI merely cited
past JDL behavior, security of foreign dignitaries at the United Nations,
and prevention of embarrassment to the United States as justification."'
The only facts which conceivably might have brought the govern-
ment's actions within the ambit of national security were the reports of
retaliation against United States citizens in Moscow, and this reason
was given after previous surveillance had been conducted.3" To use
this as a reason to justify classifying this case as a national security case
would mean that any time a United States citizen demonstrates (le-
gally or illegally) against foreign policy regarding a certain country, and
that country retaliates against Americans living or visiting there, the
United States government may then use warrantless electronic surveil-
lance in the name of protecting national security. Not only does this
28. Section 2511(3) states:
Nothing contained in this chapter . shall limit the constitutional power of the
President ....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) (emphasis added). Therefore, if the President exercised
his power unconstitutionally, his actions would remain subject to Title UT proscriptions
-specifically to section 2520 which provides for recovery of damages.
29. 363 F. Supp. at 942-43.
30. Id. at 938-39.
31. Id. at 938.
32. Id. at 941.
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allow a foreign power to control Americans' civil rights by preventing
them from demonstrating without fear of government eavesdropping,
but it gives the executive branch the power to chill unwanted criticism
of its foreign policy.
In addition, the Zweibon court failed to require a proper showing of
the JDL's connection with a foreign power. The only "connection
with a foreign power" mentioned in the case is the activities of the JDL
directed against the Soviet government, while the context of USDC's
definition suggests that the Court meant that the organization be some-
how working with the 'foreign power. Therefore, the JDL in Zweibon
should have been considered a domestic organization under USDC
since it had "no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents
or agencies. 3  But even if the facts did involve "national security"
matters, the court should have proceeded to a constitutional analysis of
the competing interests. Indeed, the USDC decision fairly presented
those factors which should have guided the Zweibon court.
Before requiring the executive to obtain a warrant prior to conduct-
ing domestic security surveillance, the USDC Court examined and bal-
anced the basic values at stake in the case-the duty of the govern-
ment to protect the domestic security and the potential danger posed
by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expres-
sion 3 4 The Court had to determine whether the needs of citizens for
privacy and free expression are better protected by requiring a war-
rant beforehand and whether the government could still successfully
33. Despite the fact that the JDL can be labeled a "domestic" organization under
USDC, it is arguable that the surveillance under consideration is not directed at the type
of activity covered by the second sentence of section 2511(3). As in USDC, where
destruction of government property was held to be within the second sentence, exempt-
ing wiretaps for the protection "against the overthrow of the Government by force or
other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government," the activities of the JDL would likewise fall under
section 2511(3). See note 27 supra for an argument that Zweibon did not fall within
the provisions of section 2511(3) and thus should have been decided under the Act.
34. 407 U.S. at 314-15. The balancing test is not new. See, e.g., Camara v. Munic-
ipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967), and Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-
24 (1971). See generally, Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent "National Security"
Decisions: Which Interests are being Protected?, 40 TENN. L. RBv. 1 (1972).
The balancing test has been cogently criticized:
If the arguments employed to justify balancing are carried to their logical conclu-
sion, then the Constitution does not contain-and is not even capable of contain-
ing-anything whatever which is unconditionally obligatory .... Anything which
the Constitution says cannot be done can be done, if Congress thinks and the
Court agrees ... that the interests thereby served outweighed those which were
sacrificed.
Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALn LJ. 1424, 1445 (1962).
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protect itself from subversion and overthrow.35
In weighing these competing interests, the USDC Court consid-
ered three contentions by the government. Initially, the government
urged the adoption of an exception to the warrant requirement in do-
mestic security situations because a requirement of prior judicial re-
view "would obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitu-
tional duty to protect domestic security."' 36  Secondly, it argued that
courts lack both the knowledge and techniques necessary to determine
if probable cause exists to believe that surveillance is necessary to pro-
tect national security. 37 Finally, it contended that disclosure of informa-
tion to a magistrate "'would create serious potential dangers to the
national security and to the lives of informants and agents ... " -38
The USDC majority rejected each of these arguments and stated
that the reasonableness 39 and probable cause40 requirements of the
fourth amendment require a judicial determination if fourth amend-
ment freedoms are to be guaranteed. 41 The Court feared that the ex-
ecutive branch could not remain disinterested enough to protect rights
of privacy and speech when the pressure to enforce the laws and obtain
incriminating evidence became great.42 Justice Powell, for the Court,
asserted that individual freedoms are best preserved when the separa-
tion of powers and division of functions are observed.43
Applying this test to Zweibon, the values that should have been
balanced are the duty of the President to successfully conduct for-
eign relations and the potential danger to individual privacy and free ex-
pression posed by unreasonable surveillance. The determination which
should have been made is whether the needs of citizens for privacy
and free expression are better protected by requiring a warrant before-
hand and whether the government could still successfully conduct
America's foreign policy.
The Zweibon decision lacks the meticulous balancing process which
pervades the USDC opinion. Instead, the Zweibon opinion is pri-
marily devoted to the argument that it is within the President's consti-
tutional power to authorize electronic surveillance in matters of for-
35. 407 U.S. at 315.
36. Id. at 318.
37. Id. at 319.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 315.
40. Id. at 316.
41. Id. at 316-17.
42. Id. at 317.
43. Id.
1974]
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eign affairs and national security,44 an argument that few legal schol-
ars would oppose. In confronting the real question at hand, whether or
not -the exercise of this power without judicial approval contravenes
fourth amendment standards, the court was satisfied with this cryptic
statement: "Based on the facts of this case the surveillances, without
prior judicial authorization, were reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and were therefore lawful. '45 It may well be that
in analyzing the competing interests at stake a reason exists which could
support the Zweibon conclusion, thus supporting a different treatment
for "national" security matters and for "domestic" security matters. In
light of the arguments advanced by the government and rejected in
USDC, however, it is difficult to visualize a rationale for such a distinc-
tion. At the very least, before being discarded, the rights of individuals
under the fourth amendment deserve more than a one sentence state-
ment of legal conclusion.
The Court in USDC attempted to clarify the warrant requirement
under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by dis-
tinguishing between "national" and "domestic" security cases under
section 2511(3). Once having established the labels, it held that do-
mestic security was not a government interest which would justify war-
rantless electronic surveillance. It failed to demonstrate how the ac-
tivities of the "domestic organization" constituted a clear and present
danger to the structure of the government thus bringing them within
section 2511(3).46 In so doing, the Court exposed section 2511(3)
to potential abuse. Relying on USDC, courts are likely to evaluate
the facts of a given case, label it as a "domestic" or "national" surveil-
lance matter, and then conclude that because a label applies it falls
within section 2511(3). The labels delineated in USDC, however,
should not become a substitute for the language of the Act, for clearly
there are instances which may involve domestic organizations which
still should be governed by the Act. In addition, there are instances
which may involve foreign governments which may not fall directly
under the language of the first sentence of section 2511(3). It is the
activity of the group which places it within section 2511(3); the com-
plexion of -the group only distinguishes the sentence which potentially
applies.
The USDC Court recognized that difficulties may result in apply-
ing the distinction in certain circumstances.4 7 The Court could not
44. 363 F. Supp. at 942-44.
45. Id. at 944.
46. See note 27 supra.
47. The Court stated:
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have anticipated, however, that the distinction would result in an appli-
cation as erroneous as that in Zweibon. Zweibon in essence said
that the JDL activities were a "national" surveillance matter because
they involved foreign affairs and that USDC was distinguishable as a
"domestic" surveillance case. Thus no warrant was required under
the fourth amendment. USDC neither stood for the proposition
that all foreign affairs matters fall under the "national" security sec-
tion of section 2511(3) nor that only "domestic" security matters re-
quired a warrant. But USDC obscured its own interpretation of
section 2511(3) by failing to demonstrate the precise language it re-
lied on and -how it applied to the facts at hand. Zweibon v. Mitchell
not only compounded that obscurity, but also judicially sanctioned ex-
ecutive rewriting of the fourth amendment.
Linda L. Nathan
No doubt there are cases where it will be difficult to distinguish between 'domes-
tic' and 'foreign' unlawful activities . . . where there is collaboration in varying
degrees between domestic groups or organizations and agents or agencies of foreign
powers ....
407 U.S. at 309 n.8.
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